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In several papers, Hauer (1988, 1989, 2000A, 2000B, 2016) has argued that the level 
of safety built into roads is unpremeditated, i.e. not the result of decisions based on 
knowledge of the safety impacts of design standards. Hauer has pointed out that the 
development of knowledge about the level of safety built into roads has been slow 
and remains incomplete even today. Based on these observations, this paper asks 
whether evolutionary theory can contribute to explaining the slow development of 
knowledge. A key proposition of evolutionary theory is that knowledge is discovered 
through a process of learning-by-doing; it is not necessarily produced intentionally by 
means of research or development. An unintentional discovery of knowledge is 
treacherous as far as road safety is concerned, since an apparently effective safety 
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treatment may simply be the result of regression-to-the-mean. The importance of 
regression-to-the-mean was not fully understood until about 1980, and a substantial 
part of what was regarded as known at that time may have been based on studies not 
controlling for regression-to-the-mean. An attempt to provide an axiomatic 
foundation for designing a safe road system was made by Gunnarsson and 
Lindström (1970). This had the ambition of providing universal guidelines that would 
facilitate a preventive approach, rather than the reactive approach based on accident 
history (i.e. designing a system known to be safe, rather than reacting to events in a 
system of unknown safety). Three facts are notable about these principles. First, they 
are stated in very general terms and do not address many of the details of road design 
or traffic control. Second, they are not based on experience showing their 
effectiveness. Third, they are partial and do not address the interaction between 
elements of the road traffic system, in particular road user adaptation to system 
design. Another notable fact consistent with evolutionary theory, is that the safety 
margins built into various design elements have been continuously eroded by the 
development of bigger and faster motor vehicles, that can only be operated safely if 
roads are wider and straighter than they needed to be when motor vehicles were 
smaller and moved slower.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past twenty years or so, the safety of cars has improved greatly, see Kahane 
(2015) for a comprehensive review. This development is to a large extent the result 
of systematic research and testing performed by car manufacturers, partly spurred by 
vehicle safety standards set by government and partly by market incentives generated 
by new car assessment programmes, such as EuroNCAP. This shows that a science-
based approach can lead to large improvements in road safety. The contrast to the 
development of road design and traffic control is stark. Although it is probably 
correct to attribute part of the improvement in road safety in many OECD-countries 
after about 1970 to improvements of roads and traffic control devices (Evans 2004, 
Elvik et al. 2009), these developments have not been instigated by research to the 
same extent as recent development in vehicle safety. 
In a series of papers, Ezra Hauer (1988, 1989, 2000A, 2000B, 2016) has pointed out 
that the level of safety built into roads, as specified in terms of design standards, is 
unpremeditated, i.e. not the result of decisions in which the safety impacts of the 
choice of design standard were considered explicitly. His examples include the 
minimum radius of crest curves, lane width and the minimum radius of horizontal 
curves. For each of these cases, Hauer shows that design standards were originally 
determined many years ago, and were not updated as new knowledge about the 
safety effects of the design standards became available. To this observation can be 
added that many roads were built, often to low standards to minimise costs, even 
before the first generation of design standards were developed. It is therefore not 
surprising that roads differ greatly in safety. 
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It is fair to ask if it remains the case even today that knowledge about how to design 
roads with a known level of safety is incomplete. Surely, one may argue, there have 
been many studies of how various road design elements are related to safety and the 
knowledge produced by these studies ought to have some value in predicting the 
safety of a new road. Unfortunately, it is not likely that even recent studies provide 
an adequate basis for reliably predicting safety. Consider, as an example, horizontal 
curve radius, one of the design parameters discussed by Hauer. Figure 1 shows the 
results of a number of recent studies made in the United States about the relationship 
between horizontal curve radius and the number of accidents in horizontal curves. 
Figure 1 about here 
The studies include those of Fitzpatrick et al. (2010), Bauer and Harwood (2013), 
Khan et al. (2013), Banihashemi (2015, 2016) and Gooch et al. (2016). Although all 
the studies included in Figure 1 show that the number of accidents (traffic volume is 
controlled for in all studies) increases as curve radius declines, there are many 
important differences between the studies. First, the type of traffic environment 
differs, although most studies refer to rural roads. Second, some studies refer to two-
lane roads, others to multi-lane roads. Third, interaction with other design elements, 
like vertical curves, is not considered in all studies. Fourth, results vary, in particular 
when curve radius is less than about 200 metres. 
It is increasingly understood that safety in horizontal curves depends on many 
characteristics of the curves (Hauer 1999): radius, the presence of transition curves, 
superelevation, interaction with vertical curves, distance to adjacent curves, number 
of lanes and whether the road is rural or urban. None of the studies included in 
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Figure 1 took all these factors into account. It is therefore not clear how any of the 
studies included in Figure 1, or a synthesis of them, can be applied in a specific 
context (defined in terms of the characteristics mentioned above) to predict the 
safety effect of a specific choice of curve radius. 
Since reliable prediction of the level of safety of a given road has been impossible, 
and still is inaccurate, the control of the safety of roads has historically relied mostly 
on a reactive approach. This means that one reacts to accidents as they occur. This 
approach has typically been applied at the local level. Perhaps the best example of 
this approach is the identification and treatment of so called black spots, or 
concentrations of accidents at a specific location, such as a junction or a curve. While 
this is widely regarded as an effective approach, a critical examination of it casts some 
doubt on this. This paper takes the following two observations to be true: 
1. It has historically been, and to some extent still is, impossible to reliably 
predict the level of safety built into a road. 
2. A dominant approach to the prevention of road accidents has therefore been 
reactive, i.e. action has been taken in response to accidents as they occur. 
The paper asks whether, given these two observations, evolutionary theory can 
explain the slow development of knowledge about the level of safety built into roads.  
 
2 KEY ELEMENTS OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
There are two key elements of evolutionary theory that are relevant when trying to 
apply it to social phenomena: (1) Learning-by-doing, and (2) The encoding of 
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practices thought to function well in terms of standardised routines. The first of 
these elements was succinctly described by the Norwegian social scientist Eilert 
Sundt, quoted by Hernes (1980), in his description of boat building along the coast 
of Norway in the middle of the nineteenth century: 
“The boat builder may be very skilled, yet, no two boats are perfectly identical to the smallest detail. 
The differences arising this way must be regarded as random. But if a small difference between two 
boats is associated with a noticeable difference in performance at sea, it is not random if such a 
difference is detected. Sailors will urge the boat builder to copy the boat that performed best at sea. 
The boat builder will now try to copy the boat performing best at sea, and may embark on a set of 
trials, each involving a small change to the boat, in order to develop a boat that surpasses the 
performance at sea of any previously built boat.” 
The first part of evolution is often referred to as learning-by-doing. A task is 
performed repeatedly, the result may not be the same every time, but if the result is 
better than last time, the difference is noticed. The discovery of an improvement (a 
mutation that improves fitness and thus increases the chance it will be passed on to 
successive generations) will lead to attempts to copy the improvement. Learning-by-
doing may then transition into a process of trial-and-error. The difference between 
learning-by-doing and trial-and-error is that in learning-by-doing, you are not 
purposely trying to improve something; if you happen to do so, it is a random event. 
Trial-and-error, on the other hand, is the purposeful search for improvements, 
which, however, may not always be attained if the process is error-prone. 
In the early days of automobilism, there was clearly very limited, if any, knowledge 
about the safety effects of various elements of road design and traffic control. As 
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time went by it was gradually understood that not all roads had the same level of 
safety and not all traffic control devices performed equally well. However, the 
emergence of this understanding was mostly not the result of research, but is perhaps 
better described as a process of discovery. The process of reacting to accident 
concentrations gradually became more and more formalised and took the form of 
what Nelson and Winter (1982:14) refer to as routines: 
“Our general term for all regular and predictable behaviour patterns is “routine”. … They are a 
persistent feature of the organism and determine its possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is 
determined also by the environment), … and they are selectable in the sense that organisms with 
certain routines may do better than others …” 
One may think of a routine as a standardised approach to the treatment of a 
problem. The detection, analysis and treatment of accident black spots, or of hired 
drivers sustaining more accidents than usual, has become quite standardised (has 
become a routine). The existence and use of routines as part of accident prevention 
is therefore evidence of a process of evolution, i.e. the routines have emerged 
gradually, first as a result of learning-by-dong, then as a result of trial-and-error. 
 
3 HOW TO ASSESS EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
How can one assess the relevance of evolutionary in explaining the slow 
development of knowledge about the level of safety built into roads? The following 
observations are consistent with an unplanned evolution of knowledge: 
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1. The use of an “accident warrant” to justify the introduction of a safety 
treatment. 
2. Evaluation of the effects of safety treatments by means of simple before-and-
after studies, not controlling for any confounding factors. 
3. Interpreting any improvement in safety from one period to the next as 
resulting solely from safety treatments introduced. 
The evolution of knowledge is methodologically naïve. Since it is an essentially 
unplanned development, it takes all observations at face value and interprets them in 
ways that support the routines that have been developed for managing safety. This 
process of developing knowledge can be slow and highly unreliable, since it neglects 
the contribution of random variation to the recorded number of accidents. 
Regression-to-the-mean may be misinterpreted as an effect of a measure. The 
importance of regression-to-the-mean was not fully understood until about 1980. A 
collection of highly instructive examples of regression-to-the-mean is given by Hauer 
and Persaud (1983). 
A case of an “accident warrant” for the use of a measure can be found in the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (2009:50): 
“In addition, the use of YIELD or STOP signs should be considered … where one or more of the 
following conditions exist: …C. Crash records indicate that five or more crashes that involve the 
failure to yield the right-of-way at the intersection under the normal right-of-way rule have been 
reported within a 3-year period, or that three or more such crashes have been reported within a 2-
year period.” 
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This warrant is a routine in the sense Nelson and Winter (1982) use the term. It is a 
trigger: If condition A is present, then do B. Perhaps the best example of how 
apparent success has been misinterpreted concerns the treatment of hazardous road 
locations, also known as black spots. It is evidence in support of evolutionary theory 
that all the early evaluations of black spot treatment were simple before-and-after 
studies, not controlling for any confounding factors and not recognising the great 
influence regression-to-the-mean is likely to have on the results of an evaluation 
(Elvik 1997). No study made before 1977 controlled for regression-to-the-mean, let 
alone mentioned the fact that it could bias results. When the results of evaluation 
studies controlling for different confounding factors were compared, Figure 2 
emerged. 
Figure 2 about here 
Studies were classified with respect to control for four potentially confounding 
factors: (1) regression-to-the-mean, (2) long-term trends, (3) changes in traffic 
volume, (4) accident migration. No study was found that had controlled for all these 
factors. Studies that controlled for three of them found no effect of black spot 
treatment. 
The history of the idea of accident proneness is very similar to that of the treatment 
of black spots. In an extensive defence of accident proneness, i.e. the idea that some 
drivers are more prone to have accidents than others, Shaw and Sichel (1971) went 
far in denying the very existence of regression-to-the-mean. Thus, trying to explain 
why the number of accidents appeared to be more stable over time in one data set 
than in another, they wrote (pages 293-294): 
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“There is much talk in statistical circles about this oscillation being a phenomenon of chance (the 
“regression toward the mean” so often mentioned). But an examination of the personal files of the 
PUTCO drivers show that these oscillations are, on the whole, anything but chance-directed. In fact, 
any sudden improvement is usually closely associated with disciplinary action.” 
One will be hard put to find a clearer example of a complete misinterpretation of 
changes in safety. First, if one estimates the regression-to-the-mean effect in the 
PUTCO data Shaw and Sichel refer to (the data are published on page 52 in the 
book), it is found that the changes from period 1 to period 2 are fully explained by 
regression-to-the-mean. There was no change in the long-term expected number of 
accidents. This is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
The first two columns show how many drivers had 0, 1, 2 etc. accidents in the first 
period. There were 162 accidents in total, making for a mean of 1.141 per driver. The 
variance was 1.346. This information can be used to estimate the expected number of 
accidents in the second period, as follows:  
Predicted number of accidents per driver in the second period =  
[(1.141/1.346) ∙ 1.141] + [(1 – (1.141/1.346)) ∙ X] 
X is the recorded number of accidents in the first period. The predicted number of 
accidents per driver is multiplied by the number of drivers who had X accidents in 
the first period and adjusted by the change in the total number of accidents 
(154/162). This results in the numbers in the rightmost column of Table 1, which are 
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remarkably close to the recorded numbers, confirming that the changes in the 
number of accidents per driver were exclusively the result of regression-to-the-mean. 
Second, the observed change in the number of accidents was automatically credited 
to a measure that was taken. Such misinterpretations can be very counterproductive. 
A thought-provoking example of this is given by Kahneman (2011), who tells how a 
lack of understanding of regression-to-the-mean in the Israeli air force lead officers 
to believe that praising pilots for a good landing was counterproductive (because the 
next landing was usually not as good), whereas punishing them for a bad landing was 
good (as the next landing was usually better). One can only imagine all the ineffective 
moral exhortations and abuse the hapless South African drivers had to put up with 
because their managers were statistically naïve. 
 
4 A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
DESIGN OF A SAFE ROAD SYSTEM 
The reactive approach to road safety, dominant for a long time, did not prevent the 
number of traffic fatalities from increasing almost without interruption in most 
highly motorised countries from about 1945 to about 1970. A need was increasingly 
felt for finding more effective means of reducing the number of road accidents than 
those that were predominantly used before 1970. 
Gunnarsson and Lindström (1970) attempted to give a comprehensive statement of 
principles for the design of a safe road system, in a book entitled: “The road to safe 
traffic”. Their contribution can be viewed as an attempt to establish an axiomatic 
foundation for designing a safe road system, by stating a few simple principles that 
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appeared to be obviously correct, or at least hard to dispute. These principles, also 
known as the SCAFT-principles, were: 
1. The location of activities: Activities should be located so as to minimise 
traffic volume and the number of points at which traffic movements intersect 
(the number of conflict points). 
2. Separation: Different types of traffic should be separated in space and/or 
time. By types of traffic, Gunnarsson and Lindström referred to pedestrians, 
cyclists and motor vehicles. 
3. Differentiation: A hierarchy of roads serving different functions should be 
developed. Long distance traffic should be served by motorways with high 
capacity, local traffic by access roads, preferably not permitting through-
traffic (i.e. traffic not starting or ending a trip on a property to which the road 
gave access). 
These principles soon gained widespread acceptance, at least in the Scandinavian 
countries, and were encoded in the road design standards of these countries. 
Gunnarsson and Lindström stated the principles in very general terms and illustrated 
their application by means of examples. References to research were surprisingly few. 
There were only twenty references in total; three of them were not to research 
reports. Despite this, Gunnarsson and Lindström were very confident in their 
assertion of the principles and did not see a need for making exceptions from them. 
Three facts are notable about the SCAFT-principles: 
1. They were stated in very general terms and did not address the details of the 
design of roadway elements, such as the design of junctions. 
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2. Their effectiveness in improving road safety was hardly documented. 
3. The principles did not address the possibility that road users might adapt 
their behaviour to the design of the road system. 
One may interpret the principles as trying to create as simple a road system as 
possible. The potential number of conflicts between traffic movements and types of 
road users should be minimised; traffic should be as homogeneous as possible and 
traffic volume on access roads minimised. It is correct, that complexity of the traffic 
environment is a risk factor (Elvik 2006). However, it does not follow that creating a 
simpler traffic environment will result in concomitant safety gains. Complexity leads 
to errors, but a good thing about errors is that one may learn from them (Amalberti 
2001). 
 
5 THE ADAPTATION TO A COMPLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEM 
It is a key proposition of evolutionary theory that species adapt to the environment. 
Polar bears have thick fur and lots of body fat to survive in the cold Arctic 
environment where they live. Successful adaptation may take a long time, but is 
remarkably effective once it has reached a local optimum. Is it conceivable that road 
users adapt to a complex traffic environment in a way that may reduce the 
effectiveness of the SCAFT-principles? To shed light on this question, data for 16 
districts of Oslo, collected many years ago by Muskaug (1980) have been analysed. 
The districts were all either purely residential areas or mainly residential areas mixed 
with small business (shops such as groceries, clothes, small restaurants, etc.). For 
each area, Muskaug (1980) collected data for the years 1971-75 about the number of 
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inhabitants, the number of people employed, area in square kilometres, length of 
local roads, number of three-leg junctions, number of four-leg junctions and number 
of junctions with the main road bordering on the area. Accident data were collected 
on: (1) Accidents inside each area involving cyclists or pedestrians; (2) Accidents 
inside each area involving motor vehicles only; (3) Accidents on the surrounding 
main road involving cyclists or pedestrians; (4) Accidents on the surrounding main 
road involving motor vehicles only. A short description of each area was provided. 
Based on this information, the following characteristics of each area were coded: 
1. A traffic volume indicator: sum of the number of inhabitants and employed 
people. 
2. A complexity indicator: [(Number of three leg junction ∙ 9) + (Number of 
four leg junctions ∙ 28) + (Number of junctions with main road ∙ 9)]/Length 
of local roads in kilometres. 
3. An indicator of differentiation: 1 if local roads do not have through traffic, 0 
if at least some local roads have through traffic. 
4. An indicator of separation: 1 if separate roads for walking or cycling are 
provided, 0 otherwise. 
The sum of population and employment is a proxy for traffic volume. The number 
of junctions have been multiplied by the theoretical number of conflict points 
between the traffic movements passing each junction and added for all junctions. 
The sum was divided by road length. The degree of differentiation and separation is 
indicated by dichotomous variables. This is clearly somewhat crude, but the data do 
not support a finer scaling of differentiation and separation. 
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A negative binomial regression model was run, using the four characteristics listed 
above as independent variables and the four categories of accidents as dependent 
variables. Table 2 shows estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors. 
Table 2 about here 
One would expect adherence to the SCAFT-principles to improve the safety of 
cyclists and pedestrians more than the safety of motorists, and have a larger effect on 
local roads in an area than on the surrounding main road. The regression coefficients 
in Table 2 are broadly consistent with such a pattern. There are, however, a couple of 
interesting exceptions. The coefficient for complexity has a negative sign in the 
model for accidents involving cyclists or pedestrians inside the area. In other words, 
increasing complexity does not appear to increase the number of accidents. One 
possible interpretation of this is that cyclists and pedestrians (and possibly also 
motorists) adapt behaviour to the complexity of the system. It is also noteworthy that 
the sign for separation is the opposite of what one would expect. It must be noted, 
however, that the standard errors of many of the coefficients are large. 
It did not take long before the SCAFT-principles were criticised. In the recent 15-20 
years, a completely different approach to urban safety has been proposed: shared 
space. 
A shared space is an area where all groups of road users are permitted to travel and 
mix at low speeds. There are no formal rules. Travel lanes are not marked, there are 
no yield or priority signs, no traffic signals, no sidewalks separated from driving lanes 
by means of kerbstone. The idea is that by mixing road users at low speed, informal 
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communication between them is encouraged, and road users will agree on who waits 
or goes first as a result of informal communication. 
When reviewing studies that have evaluated the effects on accidents of shared space, 
it is almost as seeing history repeat itself (Høye et al. 2017). Nearly all studies that 
have evaluated the effects on accidents of shared space are simple before-and-after 
studies, not controlling for any confounding factors, and likely to overestimate 
effects. These studies have all been made by advocates of the shared space concept, 
who probably believe that they have discovered an ingenious new approach to urban 
safety. It is almost unbelievable that these simple-minded and erroneous evaluation 
studies are still performed, nearly forty years after Hauer (1980) drew attention to the 
gross errors that may be committed and started to develop the Empirical Bayes 
method (Hauer 1997), which controls for regression-to-the-mean and other 
confounding factors. 
Thus, the introduction of new concepts and measures intended to improve road 
safety by modifying road design elements and traffic control devices still proceeds as 
a random walk: Someone stumbles onto something that looks like a bright idea; 
performs a hasty and amateurish evaluation of the idea and starts to propagate it as 
an effective road safety measure. Hauer (1989) called for a separation of evaluation 
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6 THE ADAPTATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT TO THE SPECIES 
Evolutionary theory describes and explains how species adapt to their environment. 
As far as the historical development of road design standards is concerned, there is 
evidence that a reverse process has also occurred: the environment as adapted to 
changing characteristics of the species populating it. This is evident in successive 
editions of the design standards for roads in Norway. 
These guidelines are revised periodically and published by the Norwegian Public 
Roads Administration (Statens vegvesen). There are absolutely no references to 
research in the design guidelines. When a design parameter is changed, there is thus 
no way of knowing why this is done. Indeed, new editions of the guidelines do not 
even refer to earlier editions and do not comment on the changes made. 
One hypothesis about changes in design guidelines for road elements, consistent with 
evolutionary theory, is that roads must be widened or straightened in order to make 
room for the ever-larger vehicles using the roads. A comparison of some key design 
parameters in the 1981, 1992 and 2013 editions of the Norwegian road design 
guidelines indicates this (Statens vegvesen 1981, 1992, 2013). Table 1 shows the 
evolution of some key parameters. 
Table 3 about here 
It is seen that the total minimum width of roads with an AADT below about 4000-
5000 has increased from 7 metres (1981), to 7.5 metres (1992) and finally to 8.5 
metres (2013). For roads with a higher traffic volume, required width has increased 
from 8.5 metres (1981 and 1992) to 10 metres (2013). The minimum radius of 
horizontal curves has also increased markedly. In 1981, the largest design vehicle that 
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was described in the design guidelines was 15 metres long and 2.5 metres wide. By 
1992, this had increased to 22 metres and 2.5 metres, respectively. These dimensions 
were almost unchanged in 2013; only the width of the design vehicle had increased to 
2.6 metres. 
Car manufacturers, in particular manufacturers of buses and heavy goods vehicles, 
adapt to more generous road standards by making the vehicles larger. Each vehicle 
can then carry more passengers or more tons of goods, which reduces the cost per 
passenger or per tonne. Road authorities adapt to this by making design standards 
more generous. They can then argue that a large share of roads do not satisfy current 
design standards and require replacement or upgrading. This is a way of protecting 
road investment budgets from cutbacks. It is worth noting that low-volume roads 
built to 1981-standards would be classified as sub-standard by 1992-standard. Roads 
built to the 1992-standards would not meet the 2013-standards. Thus, the need for 
upgrading roads to higher standards is perpetuated. 
Environments and the species populating them live in a happy symbiosis and adapt 
to each other to mutual benefit. 
 
7 DISCUSSION 
Is it really the case, as suggested by Hauer (1988, 1989, 2000A, 2000B, 2016), that 
knowledge about the safety effects of road design elements and traffic control 
devices develops slowly and comes in small doses? Is it true that this knowledge does 
not make its way into design standards for roads and criteria for the use of traffic 
control devices? There are, after all, hundreds of studies of the safety effects of 
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various elements of road design and traffic control. The research tradition is long, 
going back at least 70 years. The oldest study of the effects of road lighting quoted in 
the Handbook of Road Safety Measures (Høye et al. 2017) was published in 1948. 
This is true, but it is also true that many decisions regarding road design and traffic 
control, have historically been made without much, or any, knowledge about their 
likely effects on safety. Furthermore, it is a fact that many older studies evaluating the 
safety effects of design elements or traffic control devices were simple before-and-
after studies that did not control for important confounding factors like regression-
to-the-mean. 
Recent studies of how horizontal curves radius is related to the number of accidents 
are only beginning to uncover the complexity of the relationship. These studies show 
that one cannot predict the safety performance of a curve by using a simple rule, for 
example, that the accident rate in a curve with a radius of 200 metres is twice that of 
a straight road section. It is more complex. It depends, among other things, on the 
length of the curve and whether are similar curves nearby. 
Evolution is an unplanned, non-thinking and slow process, resulting in local optima 
in which the species of a location are adapted to the living conditions at that location 
or very similar locations. A reactive approach to safety management, triggered by 
accident experience resembles evolution in that the knowledge gained from it is 
unplanned, is often accepted at face value, and thus highly error-prone. 
One example is the use of accident warrants for the use of traffic signs, for example 
yield or stop signs. Such warrants are likely to be entirely spurious and capitalise on 
chance, unless they are accompanied by a fairly extensive guide about how one 
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should estimate the long-term expected number of accidents. One does not find any 
such guide in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. It merely states that 
the sign (yield or stop) can be used if so and so many accidents have been recorded. 
Not even traffic volume is mentioned, although, say, five accidents may not be 
abnormally high for a high-volume site, but far above the normal for a low-volume 
site. An accident warrant will often act as a permanent learning trap, since installing 
the sign will often be associated with a (random) decline in the number of accidents. 
The long-term history of some approaches in traffic engineering and some road 
design elements lend support to an evolutionary interpretation. Black spot treatment 
was long hailed as the epitome of a scientific approach to accident prevention. 
Today, it is in ruins, as most of the evaluations that found it to be effective had to be 
rejected on methodological grounds. The SCAFT-principles were intended as a 
comprehensive statement of a preventive, rather than reactive, approach to safety 
management. The principles neglected the possibility of road user adaptation to 
design elements and thus most likely overstated the safety benefits that could be 
obtained. Shared space has recently emerged as one possible new solution, mixing 
rather than separating different categories of road users. The naivete of the initial 
evaluations of its safety effects virtually guarantees that someday, someone more 




I:\SM-AVD\3398 Kjerne 21\Artikkelarkiv 2013-\Elvik_10.1016_j.aap.2017.06.008.docx 21 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
The question this paper asks is whether evolutionary theory can explain the slow 
accumulation of knowledge about the level of safety built into roads conforming to 
the design standards prevailing at any time. According to evolutionary theory, the 
initial development of knowledge is unplanned: knowledge is discovered through 
learning-by-doing.  What is learnt this way will be copied and if copying is seen as 
successful, it may develop into a routine that is followed without much reflection. 
Reactive safety management, being based on accident history, resembles a process of 
evolution in this sense. The claims made about the success of the reactive approach, 
as routinised most strictly in the identification and treatment of black spots or high-
risk drivers, are exaggerated because the reactive approach for a long time was based 
on a statistically naïve approach that mixed up regression-to-the-mean with real 
changes in safety. As a result, many flawed studies were made that did not produce 
valid knowledge. Evolutionary theory can only be applied as a heuristic device to 
help interpret and understand the development of knowledge. It is not really a 
testable theory, since history does not produce a control group that followed a 
different path of development. 
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Table 1: 
Number of accidents Number of drivers Total accidents Accidents second period Predicted number of accidents 
0 52 0 47 47.8 
1 44 44 45 46.8 
2 26 52 27 31.4 
3 16 48 27 21.7 
4 3 12 4 4.5 
5 0 0 0 0.0 
6 1 6 4 1.8 
Total 142 162 154 154.0 
Mean per driver 1.141    




 Coefficients of negative binomial regression – standard errors in parentheses 
 
Terms 
Cyclists and pedestrians inside 
area 
 
Motor vehicles inside area 
Cyclists and pedestrians on 
main roads bordering area 
Motor vehicles on main roads 
bordering area 
Constant term -5.767 (1.423) -5.770 (1.577) -4.143 (2.275) 0.893 (2.443) 
Traffic indicator 0.973 (0.158) 0.983 (0.178) 0.687 (0.267) 0.281 (0.287) 
Complexity -0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.015 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) 
Differentiated -0.658 (0.219) -0.565 (0.240) 0.426 (0.322) -0.043 (0.327) 
Separated 0.041 (0.562) 0.302 (0.515) -0.521 (0.678) -0.601 (0.630) 
Over-dispersion 0.022 (0.042) 0.081 (0.056) 0.235 (0.103) 0.267 (0.102) 
Elvik index 0.854 0.905 0.790 0.302 
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Table 3: 
 Editions of design guidelines 
 1981 1981 1992 1992 2013 2013 
Design parameter AADT 1500-4000 AADT 4000-8000 AADT 1500-5000 AADT 5000-10000 AADT < 4000 AADT 4000-6000 
Lane width (m) 3 3.25 3 3.25 3.25 3.5 
Shoulder width (m) 0.5 1 0.75 1 1 1 
Total width (m) 7 8.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 10 
Minimum horizontal curve radius (m) 100 150 160 230 250 300 
Length of largest design vehicle (m) 15 15 22 22 22 22 
Width of largest design vehicle (m) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 
 
  









































































Horizontal curve radius (metres)
Recent US studies of the relationship between horizontal curve radius and 
the number of accidents
Fitzpatrick rural four lane Bauer rural two-lane straight grade Bauer rural two-lane crest curves
Bauer two-lane sag curves Khan rural undivided Banihashemi rural multi
Banihashemi urban arterial Gooch rural two-lane
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